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CASE NOTE

“THE DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST”: COPYRIGHT’S
FREEDOM FROM CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
AFTER GOLAN v. HOLDER

JESSICA W. R ICE†
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Congress enacted section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA),1 which brought the United States into compliance with
its obligations under the Berne Convention,2 the primary accord governing
international copyright relations. The eﬀect of section 514 was to remove
millions of previously uncopyrighted foreign works—including the ﬁlms of
Alfred Hitchcock, the music of Dmitri Shostakovich and Igor Stravinsky,
and the paintings of Pablo Picasso3—from the public domain and to place
them under U.S. copyright protection.4 For decades, these works had been
freely available for public enjoyment and to inspire new artistic creation.
Now, use of these works is conditioned upon payment of a potentially

† Online Executive Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 162. J.D. & M.A.
Candidate, 2014, University of Pennsylvania; B.M., 2008, University of Michigan. Sincere thanks
to Erin Borek, D. Benjamin Thomas, and Volume 161 Associate Editors for their thoughtful and
diligent edits, and to Kirsten Boreen for her guidance throughout the writing process.
1 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976-80
(����) (codiﬁed at �� U.S.C. § 104A (2006)); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877-78 (2012)
(discussing the history of section 514).
2 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S.
T REATY D OC. N O. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
3 Marc Parry, Supreme Court Takes Up Scholars’ Rights, C HRON . H IGHER E DUC . (May 29,
2011), http://chronicle.com/article/A-Professors-Fight-Over/127700.
4 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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exorbitant fee,5 which could make access to them prohibitively expensive for
artists and arts organizations across the country.
In Golan v. Holder, the Supreme Court upheld section 514 against constitutional challenges under both the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment.6 Golan is the most recent (and the most drastic) example in a
line of copyright decisions7 that display an alarming trend in the Court’s
jurisprudence—a willingness to prolong copyright protection with no
ostensible regard for the goals of or constraints imposed by the Copyright
Clause. Although Golan raised a number of complicated issues—including
both the need for harmonization between the domestic laws of the United
States and its international legal obligations, and the inherent tension
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause—the Court made
no real attempt to address them. Instead, the Court gave Congress virtual
carte blanche to dispense copyright grants, even when doing so plunders
millions of works from the public domain. The result not only places at risk
the livelihood of thousands of artists and educators, but might also threaten
the very existence of the American public domain.
Part I of this Note reviews the historical context that led to the passage
of section 514. Part II examines the contours of the Court’s opinion and
Justice Breyer’s dissent. Part III takes up and expands upon Justice Breyer’s
arguments, while Part IV considers the adverse implications of the decision
and suggestions for future action.
I. T HE BERNE C ONVENTION AND C ONGRESS’S
PASSAGE OF SECTION 514
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (Berne Convention) is the “principal accord governing international
copyright relations.”8 Under article 18, member nations agree to provide
some level of copyright protection to works from other member nations
whose copyright terms have not yet expired.9 The United States acceded to
the Berne Convention in 1989, but did not grant retroactive copyright
5 See, e.g., Brief of Conductors Guild & Music Library Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 11, Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470828 (noting that the price of the
score of Shostakovich’s Preludes and Fugues Op. 87 has risen by a multiple of seven).
6 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889, 894.
7 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term
Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), which extended the terms of all copyrights, both future and
existing, by an additional twenty years).
8 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877.
9 Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 18.
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protection to foreign works already in the public domain at that time.10
However, fearing retaliation by other Berne Convention members, the
United States signed the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994, which demanded the implementation of
the Berne Convention’s ﬁrst twenty-one articles. 11 Pursuant to TRIPS,
Congress enacted section 514, which grants copyright protection to certain
foreign works ﬁrst published abroad between 1923 and 1989. 12 The vast
majority of these works had been residing in the U.S. public domain at the
time of section 514’s passage.13
The newly copyrighted works fall into three categories: 1) works originating in countries with which the United States had copyright agreements
at the time of the works’ publication, but whose authors failed to satisfy
formalities imposed by U.S. copyright law; 2) works originating in countries with which the United States did not have copyright agreements at the
time of publication (including, most notably, the former USSR and China);
and 3) certain sound recordings released after 1972. 14 Section 514 grants
works a copyright term equivalent to what they would have received had
the works been “properly protected initially.”15 Upon the passage of section
514, a mass of works “probably number[ing] in the millions,” which had
spent decades in the public domain, was suddenly placed under U.S.
copyright protection.16 Section 514 does include an allowance for “reliance
parties”17—those who had previously made use of the newly copyrighted

10 See Daniel Gervais, Golan v. Holder: A Look at the Constraints Imposed by the Berne Convention, 64 V AND. L. R EV. E N B ANC 147, 147-48 (2011).
11 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat.
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf
[hereinafter TRIPS].
12 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 903-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 878 (majority opinion); see also id. at 904 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15 David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, Golan v. Holder: Copyright in the
Image of the First Amendment, 11 J. M ARSHALL R EV. INTELL. P ROP. L. 83, 87 (2011).
16 Marybeth Peters, The Year in Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S. Copyright
Oﬃce, 7 F ORDHAM INTELL. P ROP. M EDIA & E NT. L.J. 25, 31 (1996).
17 A reliance party is deﬁned as “a person or business who has depended on the public domain status of the work in utilizing the work in a way that would, after restoration, be considered
copyright infringement” and must have done so “both prior to and after the restoration date.”
Reliance Parties, COPYRIGHT.GOV, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/reliance.html (last visited Apr.
5, 2013).
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works—that permits them to continue to utilize these works, but only until
the copyright owner provides notice of intent to enforce his legal interest.18
II. G OLAN V. H OLDER: T HE SUPREME C OURT D ECISION
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Conductor and music teacher Lawrence Golan, along with several other
artists, musicians, and publishers who had relied on free access to works
removed from the public domain by section 514, ﬁled suit, claiming that
section 514 both exceeded Congress’s authority under the Copyright Clause
and violated the First Amendment.19 Initially, the District Court for the
District of Colorado entered summary judgment for the government,20 but the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to assess the First Amendment claim under intermediate scrutiny.21
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiﬀs on their First Amendment claim. 22 This time, the Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that section 514 was narrowly tailored to advance the
important government interest in protecting U.S. copyright holders’
interests abroad. 23 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both the
Copyright Clause and First Amendment claims.24
B. The Majority Opinion
In a 6–2 decision written by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court
aﬃrmed the Tenth Circuit’s decision, holding that in enacting section 514,
Congress neither exceeded its authority under the Copyright Clause nor
violated the First Amendment. 25 The Court relied on its 2003 decision,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, in which it upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA) in the face of similar constitutional challenges.26

18
19
20

See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(c) (2006).
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.
Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-1854, 2005 WL 914754, at *19 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005), aff'd in
part, remanded in part, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
21 Golan, 501 F.3d at 1197.
22 Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176-77 (D. Colo. 2009), rev'd, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th
Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
23 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1095 (10th Cir. 2010).
24 Golan v. Holder, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011) (granting certiorari).
25 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 894. Justice Kagan recused herself from the case.
26 See, e.g., id. at 884-85; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003).
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The Court ﬁrst addressed Golan’s claim that section 514 violated the
Copyright Clause’s stricture that copyrights be granted for only a “limited
Time[].” 27 Resting on Eldred’s conclusion that the Clause contained no
“command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever ‘ﬁxed’ or
‘inalterable,’”28 the Court rejected Golan’s argument, reasoning that, as a
textual matter, the Clause does not preclude the extension of copyright
protection to works in the public domain. 29 Thus, the Court held that
section 514’s protections were “no less ‘limited’” than those provided by the
CTEA.30 The Court neglected to mention that the CTEA had not withdrawn any works from the public domain.
The Court next rejected Golan’s argument that section 514 thwarts the
Copyright Clause’s goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science”31 because
the law, which aﬀects only preexisting works would therefore not incentivize
the creation of new works. 32 Referring frequently to its Eldred opinion, the
Court insisted that “[t]he creation of at least one new work . . . is not the
sole way Congress may promote knowledge and learning.” 33 Rather, the
Court contended that promoting the dissemination of existing works is
equally suﬃcient to satisfy the Progress Clause’s mandate.34 In facilitating a
“well-functioning international copyright system,” the Court believed section
514 would encourage the dissemination of both existing and future works.35
The Court dispensed with Golan’s First Amendment argument with
equal swiftness, reasoning, as it had in Eldred, that “[w]hen . . . Congress
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further
First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.” 36 The Court concluded that
copyright’s “traditional contours” were unaﬀected by section 514 because
the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use defense—two of copyright’s
built-in safeguards37—were “undisturbed.”38
27 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884-85; see also U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall
have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
28 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884-85. (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 885.
31 U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887-88.
33 Id. at 888.
34 See id. at 888-89.
35 Id. at 889.
36 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003); see also Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890-91.
37 See infra Section III.C.
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The Court gave little weight to Golan’s claim that his case presented
First Amendment interests of a “higher order” than those in Eldred.39 Golan
argued that because the works aﬀected by section 514 had been in the public
domain prior to the retroactive grant of copyright, his reliance interest was
much greater than the plaintiﬀs’ interests had been in Eldred. 40 Justice
Ginsburg rejoined that “nothing in the historical record, congressional
practice, or [the Court’s] own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First
Amendment solicitude for copyrighted works that were once in the public
domain,” and cited numerous previous cases in which a work’s public
domain status was not viewed as a constitutional impediment to granting
copyright protection.41
After disposing of both the Copyright Clause and First Amendment
claims, the Court brieﬂy turned to the international fairness concerns at the
heart of the statute. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that section 514 mandates
equal treatment of all foreign works of art, whereas previously, only certain
works enjoyed copyright protection. 42 The Court ultimately credited
Congress’s determination that “exemplary compliance” with the United
States’ international obligations was necessary to promote U.S. interests
abroad,43 concluding that it had “no warrant to reject the rational judgment
Congress made.”44
C. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
In a sharp dissent joined by Justice Alito, Justice Breyer argued that, in
enacting section 514, Congress exceeded its powers under “any plausible
reading” of the Copyright Clause because the statute withdrew material
from the public domain without providing any countervailing beneﬁt. 45
This inhibition of an important preexisting ﬂow of information persuaded
the dissenters that “the Copyright Clause, interpreted in the light of the
First Amendment, [did] not authorize Congress to enact [the URAA].”46
38
39
40
41

See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890-91.
Id. at 891.
Id.
Id. at 891 & n.32; see, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495-97 (1975);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479-84 (1974); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
42 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 893.
43 Id. at 894.
44 Id. at 889.
45 Id. at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 912.
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In addition, Justice Breyer emphasized that the removal of materials
from the public domain would generate signiﬁcant problems for reliance
parties who had previously enjoyed free legal use of such materials.47 These
challenges could have been overcome had section 514 provided countervailing
beneﬁts (for example, stimulating the creation of new works). Justice Breyer
found none. Because section 514 grants copyright protection only to works
already produced, Justice Breyer concluded that “[section 514] provides no
monetary incentive to produce anything new. Unlike other American
copyright statutes from the time of the Founders onwards, including the statute
at issue in Eldred, it lacks any significant copyright-related quid pro quo.”48
Justice Breyer was less conﬁdent that section 514 violated the First
Amendment. He did, however, determine that Golan’s First Amendment
claim had enough substance to warrant the heightened scrutiny the majority
declined to impose.49
III. A NALYSIS AND C RITICISM
A. The Government’s Case and Congress’s Complacence
In its ﬁlings with the Court, the government argued that section 514 was
necessary to ensure U.S. compliance with the Berne Convention.50 If the
Convention had in fact required legislation as sweeping as section 514, the
Court likely would have been hamstrung and forced to uphold the statute.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,51 as well as the Supreme
Court’s own precedent, 52 mandates that domestic law be interpreted to
comply with international obligations. However, the Berne Convention did
not demand such drastic congressional action—there were several alternatives

47 See id. at 907 (“In practical terms, members of the public might well have decided what to
say, as well as when and how to say it, in part by reviewing with a view to repeating, expression
that they reasonably believed was, or would be, freely available.”).
48 Id. at 908.
49 See id. at 907-08.
50 See Brief for the Respondents at 11-12, Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3379598.
51 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justiﬁcation for its failure to perform
a treaty.”).
52 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that
“an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains”).
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that would have avoided placing the United States on such precarious
constitutional footing, all of which the government failed to pursue.
Article 18(3) of the Berne Convention explicitly permits the negotiation
of reservations to the article’s retroactivity principle through special conventions concluded between member countries.53 The TRIPS Agreement
constituted one such “special convention,” and in it, the United States
successfully negotiated the omission of the Berne Convention’s protection
of moral rights. 54 Nevertheless, the United States made no attempt to
obtain concessions relating to retroactive copyright protection, although
there was no evidence that such a request would require a countervailing
concession. 55 Indeed, other Berne Convention signatories—including
Germany, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—
elicited concessions with respect to retroactive protection in their countries
and arranged for permanent accommodations for reliance parties. 56 The
government’s failure to pursue an easy reconciliation between the United
States’ foreign obligations and fundamental constitutional rights resulted in,
as Justice Breyer put it, “a dilemma of the Government’s own making.”57
And yet, even concessions were not necessary to avoid the extreme
measures embodied in section 514. As Professor Gervais points out, the language of article 18 of the Berne Convention left Congress “wide latitude”—
even without securing further concessions—to determine how far its grant of
retroactive protection to works already in the public domain should extend.58
A textual reading of article 18 suggests narrow retroactivity by specifying circumstances under which copyright of foreign works shall not be
restored,59 thereby implying that existing foreign works would be protected
“in some instances only while also preserving most of the public domain.”60
And article 18(3) states that “the respective countries shall determine . . . the

53 See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(3) (“The application of this principle shall be
subject to any provisions contained in special conventions to that eﬀect existing or to be concluded
between countries of the Union.”).
54 See TRIPS, supra note 11, art. 9(1) (“Members shall not have rights or obligations under
this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of th[e Berne] Convention or
of the rights derived therefrom.”); see also Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 6bis (protecting an
author’s moral rights including the preservation of the integrity of his work).
55 See Gervais, supra note 10, at 152.
56 See Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (D. Colo. 2009), rev'd, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th
Cir. 2010), aﬀ'd, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
57 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 911 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58 Gervais, supra note 10, at 148.
59 See Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(2).
60 Gervais, supra note 10, at 150 (emphasis in original).
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conditions of application of this [retroactivity] principle.” 61 Finally, the
Convention’s legislative history displays an awareness of the existence of
legitimate reliance interests, 62 which militates against a broad grant of
retroactive protection.
Thus, although the Berne Convention surely called for some level of
retroactive protection, Congress went much further than the Convention
required. In implementing section 514, Congress moved from one extreme—
no retroactive protection for foreign works in the U.S. public domain—to
the other—withdrawing millions of works from the public domain while
reserving only a few rights to reliance parties.63
There were less restrictive means of retroactive protection available to
Congress. Instead of allowing copyright holders to name their price,
royalties could have been capped at a reasonable amount. 64 In addition,
Congress could have conditioned restored copyright protection on the
provision of necessary registration information, 65 making it easier for
prospective users of the work to locate copyright holders. Congress pursued
neither option.
Because Congress declined to take advantage of less restrictive compliance
methods permitted by the Convention, compliance with international
obligations is no excuse either for the Court’s holding or for its cursory
treatment of Golan’s legitimate Copyright Clause and First Amendment
claims. As Justice Breyer noted, the Berne Convention cannot provide section
514 “with a constitutionally sufficient justification that is otherwise lacking.”66
B. A Copyright Clause Without Force
In fact, such a constitutionally suﬃcient justiﬁcation was completely
lacking in this case. The Copyright Clause contains internal limitations,
including the requirements that a grant of copyright be for a “limited
61
62

Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 18(3).
See 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND online app. at 215 (2d ed. 2006),
http://www.oup.com/uk/booksites/content/9780198259466/15550026 (stating that the “interests of
those who might have lawfully reproduced or performed foreign works without their authors’
authorization” could be resolved by “domestic legislation”).
63 Gervais, supra note 10, at 158.
64 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 911 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65 See id. Such a provision would have gone a long way in combatting the orphan works problem. See infra Part IV.
66 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Time[]” and that it “promote the Progress of Science.” 67 Section 514
satisﬁes neither. The eﬀect of the Court’s endorsement of section 514 is,
quite simply, to “free Congress from virtually any constraint that a longstanding student of the law of copyright might once have held to be implicit
in the Copyright Clause.”68
1. Unlimited “Limited Times”: The Court’s
“Assault” on the Public Domain
Since the drafting of the U.S. Constitution, copyright terms in the United
States have followed an unwavering course of progressive lengthening. 69
Even before Golan, Professor Ochoa observed that this trend had amounted
to an “assault” by Congress on the public domain.70 That assault is exempliﬁed by three major pieces of copyright legislation enacted in the 1990s: the
URAA; the 1992 Copyright Renewal Act, which made renewal automatic
even though only ten to ﬁfteen percent of copyright holders had previously
sought to renew their copyright terms; and the CTEA, challenged in Eldred,
which extended the terms of all copyrights by an additional twenty years.71
Because the CTEA extended copyright terms not only of future works,
but of existing works as well, the Court’s holding in Eldred was particularly
controversial as the Court had never before authorized a retroactive grant of
copyright protection. However, unlike Golan, the Eldred decision dealt with
the extension of copyright protection for already copyrighted works. The
Golan Court took the implications of Eldred a signiﬁcant step further,
granting copyright protection ex nihilo to foreign works that had been in
the public domain since their creation.

67
68

U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See David Lange, Golan, Again, L EGALT ALKN ETWORK, at 7:25 (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/suﬀolk-law/2012/03/david-lange-golan-again/.
69 In 1790, the length of copyright was fourteen years, with an optional renewal for an additional fourteen years. In 1831, the length of the original term was increased to twenty-eight years
and, in 1909, the renewal term was similarly extended. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public
Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to Golan v. Holder, 64 V AND. L. R EV. E N B ANC 123, 146
n.150 (2011) (citations omitted). The Copyright Act of 1976 established a unitary copyright term,
beginning at the date of the work's creation and extending ﬁfty years beyond the author’s death.
See id. at 127. Today, “copyright lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years—likely three or
four generations for most works. Virtually no one will live to see the favorite works of their
childhood enter the public domain . . . .” Id. at 146 (footnote omitted).
70 Id. at 129.
71 See id. at 129-31. See also text accompanying note 26.
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In concluding that Eldred was dispositive of Golan’s claim that section
514 violates the “limited Times” restriction, 72 the Court overlooked the
important analytical distinction between extending copyright protection and
creating it anew. Even if Congress deserves substantial leeway in determining
how long copyright protection ought to last, it is not at all clear that Congress should be able to initiate protection whenever it chooses. As Golan
argued, allowing Congress to do so “turn[s] a ﬁxed and predictable period
into one that can be reset or resurrected at any time, even after it expires.”73
After Golan, it appears that the “limited Times” restriction requires only
that a grant of copyright have an eventual expiration date. Yet, because no
one knows when the clock might start ticking, this constraint is little better
than Congresswoman Mary Bono’s ludicrous proposal that the length of
copyright terms be “forever less one day.”74 As a result, many scholars agree
that, by upholding section 514, the Court has rendered the “limited Times”
requirement meaningless.75
2. Section 514 Does Not Further the Goals of the Progress Clause
The preamble to the Copyright Clause states that Congress may grant
copyright protection “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”76 Throughout the twentieth century, most readers understood this as
a mandate that copyright laws be crafted to encourage the creation of new
works. 77 Earlier legislative history also supports this interpretation. 78

72
73
74

Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884 (2012).
Brief for the Petitioners at 15-16, Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2423674.
144 C ONG. R EC. H9952 (Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bono). In her famed testimony
regarding the CTEA, Representative Bono, widow of Sonny Bono, commented, “Sonny wanted
the term of copyright protection to last forever. I am informed by staﬀ that such a change would
violate the Constitution. . . . As you know, there is also [a] proposal for term to last forever less
one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress.” Id.
75 See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 69, at 144 (“If Congress can validly take any work out of the
public domain and put it back under copyright protection, . . . . the ‘limited Times’
restriction . . . will be rendered a dead letter.”); see also C ATO INST., C ATO H ANDBOOK F OR
P OLICYMAKERS 395 (7th ed. 2009) (“Congress has made a mockery of [the ‘limited Times’]
requirement . . . by repeatedly and retroactively extending copyright terms.”); Claire Fong,
Golan v. Holder: Congressional Power Under the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, 7 D UKE
J. C ONST. L. & P UB. P OL’Y S IDEBAR 1, 17 (2011) (“If Congress can retroactively restore
copyright to works in the public domain, it is diﬃcult to imagine what it cannot do. Construing
‘limited Times’ in this way would rob the phrase of any meaning.”).
76 U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77 See Lange, supra note 68, at 6:05.
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Reasoning along these lines, Golan argued that section 514 violates the
Progress Clause because, by granting protection only to works already
created—many of them almost ninety years ago—the law fails to provide
any plausible incentives for the creation of new works. 79 However, the
Golan majority emphatically held that stimulating the creation of new works
is not the sole means by which Congress may “promote the Progress of
Science.”80 Rather, facilitating the dissemination of existing and future works
also satisﬁes the mandate and the majority concluded that a “wellfunctioning international copyright system would likely encourage” just that.81
This reading of the Progress Clause is reasonable and is unsurprising
given the Court’s holding in Eldred.82 However, despite the Golan majority’s
contention, it is not clear that section 514 will, in fact, serve to encourage
dissemination of copyrighted works.83 Rather, section 514 seems much more
likely to discourage dissemination of existing works, thereby failing to
advance the goal of the Progress Clause. According to Professor Olson,
although the ability to earn royalties does incentivize authors to promote
their work, “these beneﬁts are far outweighed by a general loss of access.”84
Because many potential users of the works will not pay “[t]he above-market
pricing that monopoly allows,”85 the net result will be that “those who need
78 See, e.g., H.R. R EP . N O . 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (stating “[t]he Constitution . . . provides
that Congress shall have the power to grant [copyrights]” because it “is believed to be for the
beneﬁt of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and invention”).
79 See Reply Brief at 4, Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 4500811.
80 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889.
81 Id. The Court was far too deferential to Congress’s determination. Professor Olson argues
that while Congress is entitled to a degree of deference in deciding how best to promote the
creation and dissemination of artistic works, “the Court cannot abdicate its responsibility to ensure
that copyright laws actually [satisfy this objective].” David S. Olson, A Legitimate Interest in
Promoting the Progress of Science: Constitutional Constraints on Copyright Laws, 64 V AND. L. R EV. E N
B ANC 185, 191-92 (2011).
82 See id. at 888 (summarizing Eldred for the proposition “that the Copyright Clause does not
demand that each copyright provision, examined discretely, operate to induce new works”).
83 History has shown that even copyright owners themselves can egregiously miscalculate the
eﬀect that strict enforcement of copyright protections will have on the dissemination of their
copyrighted works. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., copyright owners sued
to halt the manufacture and distribution of VCRs, based on the theory that the use of VCRs to
record televised programs would impair the future value of their copyrights. 464 U.S. 417, 420
(����). This prediction could not have been further oﬀ the mark: “[T]he VCR, which was once
believed to be the death knell of the movie business[, instead arguably became] its savior, as
consumers have proven willing to pay to buy or rent [movies] . . . .” Dan Ackman, Movie Studios
Get Hip With the Future, F ORBES.COM (Aug. 17, 2001), http://www.forbes.com/2001/08/17/
0817topnews.html.
84 Olson, supra note 81, at 193.
85 Id.
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[these works] for scholarly, educational, or cultural purposes” 86 will be
forced to do without. The Progress Clause, as it was interpreted in Golan, is
unlikely to impose any meaningful constraint on future copyrights.
C. The First Amendment Claim: A Wasted Opportunity to Face the Tension
Between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment
Before Golan, the Court had responded to First Amendment challenges
to copyright legislation in a “cavalier and barely coherent fashion.”87 But
Golan’s First Amendment claim was undeniably stronger than these earlier
claims because section 514 applies to works that, for decades, had been
freely available for artists to use as a basis for new artistic expression.
Indeed, because Golan represented “the ﬁrst time in history” that copyright
legislation was challenged “directly and primarily” on First Amendment
grounds,88 it seemed that the Court could no longer avoid directly addressing the relationship between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.
And even though they ultimately reached diﬀerent conclusions, both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit agreed that the First Amendment issues
in the case merited heightened scrutiny.89
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court persisted in dodging the First
Amendment question, giving it “such short shrift . . . as to amount, once
again, to no real opinion at all.” 90 The eﬀect of the Court’s disinterest
toward the legitimate First Amendment issues at stake in Golan is that
copyright, “though not formally immune to First Amendment protection,
[has become] immune in all but form.”91
There is an intrinsic tension between the Copyright Clause and the
First Amendment’s protection of free expression that demands consideration. In its brief, the government admitted that “the very purpose of
copyright protection is to limit the manner in which expressive works may
86
87
88
89

Golan, 132 S. Ct at 903 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Lange, Weaver & Reed, supra note 15, at 111.
Id. at 130.
The district and circuit courts both applied intermediate scrutiny, which demands that a
content-neutral regulation be upheld “if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to
the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
further those interests.” Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009), rev'd, 609
F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), aff 'd, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); see also Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076,
1083 (10th Cir. 2010).
90 Lange, supra note 68, at 8:50.
91 See id. at 10:02.
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be used,” and that limitations on expressive activity are “the intended and
inherent eﬀect of every grant of copyright.”92 Until Eldred, the Court had
provided no indication as to how this tension might be relieved. There,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, concluded that where “Congress
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further
First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”93 She did not deﬁne “traditional
contours,” but she did make clear that violating these “contours” was a
prerequisite to the application of First Amendment scrutiny.94
Initially, the Tenth Circuit in Golan reasoned that prior to the passage
of section 514, “every statutory [copyright] scheme preserved the same
sequence. A work progressed from 1) creation; 2) to copyright; 3) to the
public domain” while, under section 514, “the copyright sequence no longer
necessarily ends with the public domain: indeed it may begin there.” 95
Thus, the court concluded that a “traditional contour” of copyright law—the
principle that works in the public domain typically remain there—had been
altered, and it directed the court below to undertake a heightened First
Amendment analysis.96 The district court, on remand, found that section
514 was substantially broader than necessary to comply with U.S. treaty
obligations and therefore could not survive intermediate scrutiny.97 Upon
its own application of intermediate scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit disagreed,
concluding that section 514 was suﬃciently tailored to the important
government interests it served.98
Based on the lower courts’ readings of section 514, it seemed the
Supreme Court could no longer avoid a serious First Amendment analysis.
The Court, however, defied expectations when it denied that section 514
altered the “traditional contours” of copyright protection.99 Justice Ginsburg
92
93
94
95
96

Brief for the Respondents, supra note 50, at 34.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
Id.
Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1196-97. Although removing works from the public domain and placing them under
copyright protection was not unheard of prior to the passage of section 514, it had always occurred
on a much smaller scale and, typically, under extenuating circumstances (for example, during a
world war). See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 887 (2012) (noting that “in 1919 and 1941,
Congress authorized the President to issue proclamations granting protection to foreign works
that had fallen into the public domain during World Wars I and II,” respectively).
97 See Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (D. Colo. 2009), rev'd, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th
Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (stating that “Congress could have complied with the Berne
Convention without interfering with a substantial amount of protected speech”).
98 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2010).
99 See, e.g., Lange, Weaver & Reed, supra note 15, at 125 (“Restoration under the URAA
cannot be said to be traditional in any sensible meaning of that term.” (emphasis added)).
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gave the narrowest possible reading to the term that she had left undeﬁned
for nearly a decade, holding traditional “contours” synonymous with the
traditional “safeguards” of copyright, those being the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.100 Because section 514 leaves these two
safeguards intact, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the traditional contours
of copyright had not been altered.101
The Court’s deﬁnition of “traditional contours” is plainly underinclusive. The idea/expression dichotomy and fair use doctrines permit only
limited public access to copyrighted works102 and can hardly be deemed to
constitute the complete “traditional contours” of copyright. What about the
originality requirement? 103 The “limited Times” requirement? Or, most
pertinently, the heretofore well-established line between private ownership
and the public domain?104 Justice Ginsburg, who herself was responsible for
coining the term “traditional contours” in Eldred, clearly backpedaled in
Golan, deﬁning the term so narrowly that the Court once again managed to
circumvent a proper First Amendment analysis. Although scholars had been
optimistic that Golan would be the “occasion for the adoption of a change in
direction for the First Amendment,”105 the decision had the opposite eﬀect.
Despite Golan’s signiﬁcantly stronger claims, the Court oﬀered a nearly
verbatim reiteration of the Eldred decision, further subjugating the First
Amendment to the whims of what is fast becoming a completely unbounded
doctrine of copyright.

100 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890. The idea/expression dichotomy refers to the distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas. Id. The fair use defense provides
“latitude for scholarship and comment,” id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), but
does not allow the use of a work in its entirety. Lange, Weaver & Reed, supra note 15, at 104.
101 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890-91.
102 For example, under “fair use,” an individual may be free to perform a few measures of a
copyrighted musical score, though not the entire piece. See Lange, Weaver & Reed, supra note 15,
at 104.
103 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (establishing that only “original works of authorship” are suitable
subject matter for copyright protection); see also Fong, supra note 75, at 18 n.145 (“[B]ecause it is
constitutionally required, the originality requirement certainly qualiﬁes as a traditional contour of
copyright protection.”).
104 See Brief of Heartland Angels, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14,
Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470833 (concluding that the dividing line between
public and private ownership is “certainly one of those traditional contours [of copyright law]” and
noting that “[s]ince its earliest days, copyright has made a clear distinction between what is
protected and what is freely available to the public”).
105 Lange, Weaver & Reed, supra note 15, at 130.
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IV. G OLAN’S FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Court’s decision oﬀers bleak prospects for artists, musicians,
ﬁlmmakers, and the public at large. Most signiﬁcantly, section 514 will limit
the dissemination of historically and politically important works. For many
schools and nonproﬁt organizations, it will likely render the use, study, or
performance of these works impossible, “aggravating the already serious
problem of cultural education in the United States.”106
The eﬀects of the Golan decision will be felt rapidly and acutely
throughout the artistic community. As a result of section 514, a copyright
holder is free to charge for the use of his work. While the concept of usage
fees is surely not novel for artists, section 514 is “uniquely disruptive”
because it authorizes usage fees where previously there were none, thereby
harming reliance parties who had depended on the ability to freely access
aﬀected works.107 For many nonproﬁt groups that oﬀer concerts, showings,
and other public performances of newly protected works, these usage fees
will be prohibitively expensive.108 Moreover, groups that legally purchased
copies of music or other reproductions while the relevant works were in the
public domain may only continue to use these copies if they pay fees for
each additional use.109 In sum, “[t]hese new hurdles . . . limit the breadth
of education for music students and deprive audiences of valuable artistic,
intellectual, and emotional experiences.”110
The newly imposed licensing fees will also affect derivative works—
original works of art based on works whose copyrights have been restored
under section 514.111 While the initial creation of these works did not constitute copyright infringement because the source material was in the public
domain at the time, creators of these works will now be forced to pay restored

106
107

Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 905 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See Brief of Conductors Guild & Music Library Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 5, at 9.
108 See id. at 7 (“Seventy percent [of surveyed members of the Conductors Guild and of the
Music Library Association] are no longer able to perform works previously in the public domain—
works performed regularly before the passage of Section 514—because those works are now under
copyright protection.”).
109 See id. at 5.
110 Id.
111 A derivative work is “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, ﬁctionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).

15 Rice Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

“The Devil Take the Hindmost”: Golan v. Holder

6/1/2013 12:08 AM

299

copyright holders for their continued use. The only protection that section
514 offers is a stipulation that the required compensation be “reasonable.”112
Section ��� also imposes signiﬁcant administrative burdens on artists
and arts organizations, including the costs of determining whether a work is
subject to restored copyright, searching for the copyright holder, and
negotiating a usage fee. 113 These costs are particularly acute for “orphan
works”—older and obscure works whose copyright owners are often impossible to locate.114 There are millions of such works115—which are frequently of
signiﬁcant historical and cultural importance despite having minimal
commercial value116—and the cost of obtaining the requisite information can
be substantial.117 These administrative costs could lead to a de facto moratorium on the use of orphan works.
Even more signiﬁcant than the immediate consequences of Golan is the
shadow the decision casts on the future of the American public domain. It
may be that, because the Golan Court took such drastic steps to emaciate the
public domain, the American public will be hesitant to rely on a work’s
public domain status in the future.118 Because Golan sets no explicit limit on
the reach of its holding,119 artists will be understandably fearful that any
112
113
114

Id. § 104A(d)(3).
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 905 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. Orphan works may exist, for example, because the copyright holder’s contact information cannot be found; the copyright holder does not realize the work is copyrighted; or the
copyright has been assigned to a new owner, whose identity is unknown. See JISC, IN FROM THE
C OLD: A N A SSESSMENT OF THE S COPE OF ‘O RPHAN W ORKS’ AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
D ELIVERY OF S ERVICES TO THE P UBLIC 11-12 (2009), available at http://sca.jiscinvolve.org/
wp/ﬁles/����/��/sca_colltrust_orphan_works_v�-ﬁnal.pdf.
115 See id. at 6.
116 See C ATO I NST ., supra note 75, at 395.
117 See Brief of American Library Ass’n, Ass’n of College & Research Libraries, Ass’n of
Research Libraries, Univ. of Mich. Dean of Libraries, Internet Archive & Wikimedia Found. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15, Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2533007
(forecasting that the University of Michigan will spend more than $1 million identifying owners of
orphan works in the university’s HathiTrust collection).
118 See Fong, supra note 75, at 19 (predicting that a holding similar to the Court’s decision in
Golan would “seriously undermine the integrity of the public domain in a way that could
permanently stiﬂe its use by the public”).
119 For example, it is unclear whether, because section 514 grants retroactive copyright protection to foreign works that fell into the public domain due to their creators’ failure to observe
U.S. copyright formalities, domestic works in the public domain for the same reason should
receive equivalent treatment. See Tyler Ochoa, Comments on the Golan v. Holder Supreme Court
Ruling (Guest Blog Post), ERIC GOLDMAN: TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Jan. 23, 2012, 2:53 PM),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/01/ochoa_on_golan_1.htm (“I anticipate that owners of
copyright in domestic works will now lobby Congress for the same advantage that foreign
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public work they utilize might soon be “restored” to copyright by Congress,
placing them in a financially compromising position. Now that the Court has
established that Congress has wide latitude in removing previously uncopyrighted works from the public domain, Congress could also theoretically
grant retroactive protection to previously copyrighted public domain works
whose copyrights have expired.120
Golan does not necessarily sound the public domain’s death knell,121 but
it has issued so broad a license to Congress that ostensibly there remain no
principled constitutional safeguards against the public domain’s continued
erosion. Professor Ochoa’s conclusion that the public domain now “exists
only at the whim and forbearance of Congress and can be taken away from
the public and privatized at any time”122 may not be an overstatement.
C ONCLUSION
Golan presented the Court with a diﬃcult task, forcing it both to address
the sensitive matter of U.S. compliance with international legal obligations
and to navigate the cumbersome constitutional issues presented by the
constraints of the Copyright Clause and its interaction with the First
Amendment. Although the holding itself is problematic, what is more
troubling is both the majority opinion’s lack of depth and its failure to
recognize the legitimate interests at stake. The Court engaged in little more
than a hand-waving exercise, cavalierly extending Eldred to a vastly different
realm of artistic works—those already in the public domain—without
appreciation for the effects of its decision on the lives and livelihood of artists

copyright owners received [through section 514]: restoration of copyright for those works that are
in the public domain for failure to comply with formalities such as copyright notice and renewal.”).
A decision to extend copyright protection to such works would likely aﬀect the public domain
status of eighty-five percent of those works published in the United States between 1923 and 1963. Id.
120 See Lange, supra note 68, at 6:58. Lamenting the future prospects for copyright law in the
wake of Golan, Professor Lange concludes:
“Copyright has slipped its moorings after Golan. There is nothing in the Constitution now to constrain it, at least as far as the Supreme Court of the United States is
concerned. The world of expression belongs to Congress, which belongs in turn to
the NPAA or the RIAA and the copyright industries, and the devil take the hindmost.”
Id. at 12:05. This language also inspired the title of this Note.
121 Cf., e.g., Ochoa, supra note 69, at 144 (“Ultimately, what is at stake in Golan is nothing less
than the entire corpus of works in the public domain, and even the entire concept of a public
domain.”).
122 Id. at 146.
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or for the fact that its decision, if taken to its logical conclusion, could
threaten the very existence of the American public domain.
However, on a more optimistic note, the Court’s March 2013 decision,
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.123—with Justice Breyer writing for the
majority and Justice Ginsburg in dissent—demonstrates that all may not be
lost for the future of copyright. Addressing the “ﬁrst sale” doctrine,124 which
is obliquely related to the issues central to Golan, Kirtsaeng represents a rare
and important refusal by the Court to bow to the demands of copyright
holders. The decision endorses the lawful foreign purchase of Englishlanguage textbooks and their importation to and resale in the United
States.125 In declining to recognize a geographic limitation on the ﬁrst sale
doctrine, 126 the Court displayed a concern for the reliance interests of
libraries, museums, and used-book dealers; an awareness of the practical
infeasibility of tracking down foreign copyright holders to request permission to disseminate works that have been lawfully obtained; and, ultimately,
a recognition that such inhibition of the free ﬂow of artistic and literary
works fails to satisfy the mandate of the Progress Clause.127 Though the
decision in Kirtsaeng by no means undoes the damage inﬂicted by Golan,
perhaps it is an indication that the tide of the Court’s copyright jurisprudence is ﬁnally beginning to turn.
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124

133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
17 U.S.C. § ���(a) (����). The “ﬁrst sale” doctrine provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” Id.
125 See Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1356.
126 Id. at 1358.
127 See id. at 1364 (“How . . . are the libraries to obtain permission to distribute these millions of books [which were published abroad]? How can they ﬁnd, say, the copyright owner of a
foreign book, perhaps written decades ago? . . . And, even where addresses can be found, the costs
of ﬁnding them, contacting owners, and negotiating may be high indeed. Are the libraries to stop
circulating or distributing or displaying the millions of books in their collections that were printed
abroad?”).

